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To summarize, the analytical approach 
described by Maei et al. (2009) provides a 
more effective and accurate new measure in 
terms of its superb sensitivity and statistical 
validity in water maze studies. Furthermore, 
the H measure will contribute greatly to 
the advancement of behavioral assays that, 
in conjunction with molecular genetic 
approaches, are designed to elucidate the 
molecular mechanisms underlying learning 
and memory.
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Voluntary action is a fundamental 
  characteristic of human behavior and 
identiﬁ  es our ability to realize intention-
ally driven tasks. Functional imaging work 
has indicated that intentional perform-
ance activates neural circuitry conﬁ  ned 
to the fronto-medial cortex (Cunnington 
et al., 2002; Lau et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 
2005). This network activity integrates, 
besides the conscious experience of intend-
ing (Haggard and Clark, 2003; Lau et al., 
2004), a series of processes in relation to 
the intentional act (Brass and Haggard, 
2007). Accordingly, intentional behav-
ior can be viewed as a form of decision 
making that consists of various compo-
nents with different types of information 
processing (Brass and Haggard, 2008; 
Haggard, 2008). This distinctive viewpoint 
is important as voluntary action has often 
been regarded as a unitary concept  without 
little   consideration for the component 
functions. In this respect, it has been sug-
gested that voluntary action has at least two 
decisional processes: what action to per-
form (selection component) and when to 
perform it (timing component), (Mueller 
et al.,  2007). Thus, the “what” decision 
speciﬁ  es which action to perform from a 
range of alternative options, whereas the 
“when” decision denotes the moment in 
time at which to execute the action.
In their recent contribution to Frontiers 
in Neuroscience, Krieghoff et  al. (2009) 
presented an fMRI study that provides 
new insights into voluntary behavior. In 
particular, the authors proposed a well-
designed protocol in which they simulta-
neously and independently manipulated 
the selection and timing component within 
one experimental paradigm. Moreover, the 
  participants were instructed to perform 
one of two possible actions at one of two 
possible moments in time. Furthermore, 
the action and moment in time were freely 
chosen or externally triggered by means of 
a cue. In other words, the “what” (selec-
tion) and “when” (timing) decision of the 
impending action were based on an inter-
nal judgment or imposed by an external 
  stimulus. This distinction between inter-
nally and   externally generated responses 
is relevant as both types of activities are 
known to have (partly) dissociable neural 
circuitry in respect to the component proc-
ess of selection, as well as timing (Deiber 
et al., 1999; Cunnington et al., 2002, 2006; 
Lau et al., 2006).
As the main objective of Krieghoff et al. 
(2009) was to investigate the decisional 
processes of voluntary behavior, the data 
analysis focused primarily on the cue-
related activity that speciﬁ  ed the decision 
making process rather than on the target-
related activity that represented the imple-
mentation of that decision. In view of that 
premise, the whole-brain analysis of the 
cue-related signal showed that two fronto-
medial wall areas associated with distinct 
component functions of voluntary action: 
whereas the selection component linked 
strongly with the rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ), the timing component tied closely 
with the superior medial frontal gyrus 
(SFG), which is localized close to pre-SMA 
(Rushworth, 2008). These results indicate 
that separate brain regions are involved in 
distinct decisional processes, and accord-
ingly highlight a functional dissociation of Frontiers in Neuroscience  May  2010 | Volume  4 | Issue  1 | 3
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intentional action. However, an additional 
signal strength analysis revealed that both 
processes interact with one another. In 
particular, neural activity within the para-
medial frontal cortex was increased for 
internal as compared to external timing, 
but only when action selection was speci-
ﬁ  ed externally. Combined, these observa-
tions challenge the idea of a unitary control 
system and   underscore the existence of 
distinct, albeit interdependent, decisional 
processes that together shape voluntary 
action (Brass and Haggard, 2008). Of note 
is that this dependency is in accordance 
with the argument that aspects from the 
component processes have to be considered 
in order for an action and its consequences 
to be evaluated.
By introducing an innovative experi-
mental paradigm, the work of Krieghoff 
et al.  (2009) has provided a signiﬁ  cant 
step into the understanding of intentional 
control by specifying dissociable brain 
regions that deal with component func-
tions. Further research into the dynamics 
of voluntary action is necessary in order 
to detail the functional architecture of 
  intentional behavior and its neural corre-
lates. Future studies may elaborate on the 
inter-regional inﬂ  uences and coordination 
of the brain areas that make up the network 
activity, and the means by which context-
related factors modify intentional process-
ing within the circuitry.
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Sensory systems are confronted with a con-
tinuous stream of inputs, but only a small 
fraction of these sensory stimuli reaches 
our awareness, is consciously   perceived 
and can be remembered. Perception is 
never driven solely by the bottom-up 
stimulation, but crucially depends on the 
top-down modulations. Top-down signals 
convey behavioral context, such as atten-
tion, expectation and perceptual task, and 
are reﬂ  ected in the context-speciﬁ  c response 
modulation in single neurons (Miller and 
Cohen, 2001; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). 
Top-down interactions can be of many dif-
ferent kinds: augmenting or multiplying 
responses, sharpening tuning curves, con-
trolling   contextual inﬂ  uences, or acting as 
a modulator of plasticity (Desimone and 
Duncan, 1995; Maunsell and Treue, 2006). 
Although a lot of empirical knowledge has 
been accumulated on how top-down inter-
actions modulate neural responses, only a 
few theoretical attempts have been made so 
far to explain the underlying   biophysical 
mechanisms and to bridge the gap between 
the behavioral and single-cell data (Buia 
and Tiesinga, 2006; Deco and Rolls, 2006; 
Ardid et al., 2007).
The recent study by Zylberberg 
et al.  (2009) published in Frontiers in 
Computational Neuroscience aims to 
uncover these biophysical mechanisms in 
a particular setting of top-down memory 
retrieval. The authors try to answer several 
general and long-standing questions: How 
do the bottom-up and top-down signals 
interact to produce a perception? What 
are the neural mechanisms of effortless 
(iconic) vs voluntary (working) memory? 